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INTRODUCTION
The common pool problem arises in situations where the costs of an activity which benefits a small group are shared among a wider group of people. An everyday example would be a dinner where the participants have decided to split the bill. Fishing and oil drilling provide larger-scale examples. As suggested by Tullock (1959) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962) the problem can also arise in politics. In many cases each politician represents only a group of voters, but has access to a common pool in the form of the total tax base of all voters.
Situations of this kind could explain phenomena like logrolling and pork barrel politics. Weingast et al. (1981) formalize this line of reasoning. In their setting, each district or political unit determines the size of a project. This is done exclusively on the basis of benefits and costs that are associated with the own district. A crucial assumption is what they label universalism, which means that all projects are accepted by the central decisive instance (conceivably in one omnibus budget bill). The costs of all projects are financed through taxes levied on people in all districts in a common pool area. The simplest case is one with identical districts and with a proportional income tax. In that case, each district internalizes all marginal benefits from its own projects, but faces only 1/n-th of the marginal cost, inducing larger projects than what is efficient. This principle is usually referred to as the "law of 1/n".
Several articles have examined the common pool problem empirically and most of them assume that each legislator represents one district. The number of legislators determines the size of the common pool and expenditures are expected to grow with its size. Most studies, e.g. Baqir (2002) and Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995) , support the law of 1/n, but recently Petterson-Lidbom (2006) reports serious empirical doubts.
As pointed out by Primo and Snyder (2005) , there are also a few theoretical caveats to the intuitive common pool story. When the number of citizens in a common pool area is fixed while the number of districts and district size vary, which is the case in most empirical studies, the law of 1/n only holds for publicly provided private goods. For local districtspecific public goods, spending per capita is independent of the number of districts. 1 Primo and Snyder also show that crowding enhances the law of 1/n, while deadweight cost and partial cost-sharing diminishes it. A "reverse law of 1/n" may even apply for goods that are 3 sufficiently public in nature and have considerable deadweight costs in taxation or partial cost-sharing.
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Another line of criticism takes a step back by asking why a political assembly would adopt decision making rules, or adhere to norms, that allow for taxation which is independent of individual districts' project size. Finally, the degree to which a politician can be said to represent a district varies between electoral systems and political assemblies; it may for instance be greater at the national than at the local level.
In a situation with theoretical objections and mixed empirical evidence there is need for additional studies. We hope to contribute by investigating a case where the conditions are very favorable for the appearance of a common pool effect. We test the common pool hypothesis by studying the 1952 Swedish municipal amalgamation reform. According to theory we expect the municipalities (our units) that knew that they would soon be amalgamated with others to increase their debt before the amalgamation was carried through;
especially units that made up a small part of the forthcoming amalgam. Prior to amalgamation, expenditures almost exclusively benefit the own unit, while the financing of debt is shared with the other units in the amalgam. The amalgam is thus a unit's common pool area and changes in debt measure the financial exploitation of the common pool. In our case district size is fixed. It is also clear that the politicians in each unit represent the constituents in their unit in relation to other units in the common pool. Thus, our approach avoids all mentioned theoretical objections.
Our study combines several ways of estimating the common pool effect. First, we analyze the cross section for the whole period 1947−1951. We start with ordinary least squares (OLS). Then, we use geographical instrumental variables (IV) to correct for unit specific and idiosyncratic unobservables as well as measurement errors. Further, we use matching to check the robustness against non-linearities. Second, we exploit the panel feature, which allow us to examine the dynamics by introducing year specific treatment effects. We can also control for macro shocks by using year dummies. We use a within identification strategy with fixed effects (FE) to correct for unit specific unobservables. Also in the panel analyses, we use a geographical IV strategy to adjust for remaining idiosyncratic unobservables and measurement errors. Finally, we divide the sample into three groups based 2 Another theoretical issue which Crain (1999) addresses it that of district heterogeneity. When districts are similar there are fewer reasons to seek district-specific projects, since all districts favor the same global public goods. For intra-district heterogeneity the reverse is true. Consider a case with two groups of constituents with opposing demands in a district. This district will probably not invest in programs that favor any of those groups, leading to fewer district-specific projects. Inter-district homogeneity and intra-district heterogeneity reduces the common pool effect (but cannot reverse it). Crain finds some empirical support for these two hypotheses. percent of the average increase in income. The direction of correction when using matching and IV is ambiguous, but ATE always stays positive and economically sizeable. The positive ATE supports the presence of a common pool effect. However, the treatment effect we find is independent of common pool size with OLS, and varies even negatively with common pool size with FE, contrary to what the law of 1/n predicts. When combined with FE, the use of IV strengthens the negative effect. Allowing for group specific treatment effects, we find that the negative effect only prevails for units with less than 500 inhabitants, and there is some support for a positive effect for units with more than 1,000 inhabitants. These effects are however small compared to the constant treatment effect. The general picture is one of freeriding but without clear support for the law of 1/n.
RELATED EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
To highlight the differences between our strategy and previous approaches, we briefly review the empirical literature. Baqir (2002) uses cross sectional data from U.S. cities in the 1990s to examine the common pool problem due to districting. He finds a positive relationship between council size − a proxy for the number of districts − and government spending. This effect is strengthened when using council size in 1960 as an instrument for council size in 1990 in order to remedy possible reverse causation. The main problem with this strategy is that there might be omitted city specific unobserved variables that correlate with both spending and council size that are persistent over time.
Unit specific unobservables can be taken care of with a fixed effects strategy. Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995) common pool theory predicts. However, also in his set-up we expect a common pool effect only for public goods that are district-specific.
In a paper closely related to ours, Tyrefors (2006) studies the later Swedish amalgamation reform of 1969−1973. The empirical strategy relies on controlling for observable characteristics to account for the principles which were laid out by a governmental committee in 1961: population since the new municipalities were required to have at least 8,000 inhabitants, and a set of mostly economic variables that should capture what is called "scientific principles of functionality". Tyrefors finds a sizable common pool effect; municipalities making up a relatively small part of an amalgam increased their per capita debt more before the amalgamation. However, selection only on observables is often too bold an assumption when it comes to political processes. As an example, studies by Alesina and Spolaore (1997) , Bolton and Roland (1997) , and Persson and Tabellini (2000) point out that economic factors and underlying voter preferences influence the unification and break-up of political units. Since it is unlikely that all of these factors can be observed, we have to consider selection on unobservables in our empirical strategy. By using matching estimators, we also allow for non-linear effects. Moreover, there are several reasons − 6 explained in the next section − for believing that the earlier reform of 1952 is more suitable than the later one of 1969−1973 when it comes to estimating a causal and precise common pool effect. 
SWEDISH MUNICIPAL REFORMS
Through the municipal reform of 1862 Sweden received a uniform administrative system with approximately 2,500 municipalities in 24 counties (SOU, 1978) . Formally, there were also 267 districts, 6 which was a level between municipalities and counties, but this historically important level lost its administrative importance in the reform. Each municipality was also classified as rural municipality, borough or city 7 . The municipal districting was based on the old parish borders and less due to functional and economical considerations. Soon the flaws became obvious as the rural municipalities could not provide for increasing welfare demands of the citizens. Emigration from rural areas to the cities worsened the problem.
In 1939 the legislature recognized the problem and in 1943 a commission was appointed to investigate possible remedies (Sandalow, 1971) . In 1945 the commission proposed large scale amalgamations of municipalities aiming at more than 2,000 citizens in the new units. It also provided a detailed recommendation on the new districting. The idea was to merge small municipalities without splitting them. The functionality of the new units received little attention. In 1946 a unanimous parliament decided and publicly announced a revision of local government boundaries on the detailed recommendation proposed by the commission (Strömberg and Westerståhl, 1984) . After four years of preparatory work, the government decided in 1950 that the new apportionment be executed in 1952, and this was also accomplished. Figure 1 shows a timeline on how the reform process progressed. General 5 Hanes (2003) is a somewhat related study since he investigates the same municipal amalgamation reform as we do. The important difference is that he studies the period after the reform. He finds economies of scale for small municipalities, but reduced effects for larger ones. His study also addresses the problem of unit specific unobservables, such as the natural affinity between amalgamated municipalities. He uses a Probit model in a first stage to predict amalgamation probabilities, and uses these predicted probabilities in a second stage regression with expenditure as dependent variable. He finds no amalgamation effect in the second stage with this strategy. 6 The Swedish term is "härad" which often is translated as "hundred". We use the term "district", which is used by some authors. This should not be confused with the modern Swedish districts which are subunits of the municipalities. 7 The Swedish terms are "landskommun", "köping" and "stad". The first is sometimes translated as "rural commune". We use "rural municipality" due to its lack of normative flavor.
elections were held in 1940 , 1944 , 1948 and 1952 . Municipal elections were held in 1942 , 1946 and 1950 .
Figure 1. Timeline on the progress of the reform
The reform reduced the number of rural municipalities from 2,284 to 823, while all 81 boroughs and 133 cities remained intact and most of them without any changes in borders.
Thus, the total number of municipalities declined from 2,498 in 1951 to 1,037 in 1952. Most merging was between rural municipalities in the same district. 304 rural municipalities were unaffected by the reform. The average population increased from about 1,500 to 4,000 due to the reform. The average tax base per municipality more than doubled.
The 1952 reform turned out to insufficient to achieve the intended objectives (Gustafsson, 1978 1939 1952 1950 1945 1946 1943 8 Second, the last reform was more carefully planned with specific economic guidelines, while the 1952 reform was more random in an economic sense. Thus, efficiency arguments permeated the 1952 reform much less than the last reform, which is why the 1952 reform soon was considered inadequate. This means that unobservables are less likely to influence an econometric investigation of the 1952 reform. Third, the different dates of amalgamations in the last reform make the panel unbalanced. Fourth, more rural municipalities were unaffected in the first reform, which provides a better control group to the majority of treated rural municipalities. Fifth, there were more units in the 1952 reform.
The Municipal Administration Act of 1862, which is part of the Swedish Constitution, gives the Swedish municipalities the right to run their own affairs (Sandalow, 1971) .
However the meaning of this right is not further specified, other than that they have to obey special legislations on some issues. Although this feature often gives the central government the upper hand in conflicts, the Swedish municipalities have much freedom in running their own projects. Generally, they do not have to consult the central government when deciding about municipal specific issues (Gustafsson, 1978) . Although there are restrictions on long term debt, there are none on short term debt, and there is no balanced budget rule. According to the Constitution, the municipalities are also entitled to levy local income tax, impose certain charges, and demand remuneration for services and benefits. The municipalities also have a planning monopoly, which means that they can decide how land should be used, even though this formally has to be approved by a central authority. In consequence, Swedish municipalities are major economic actors, even if the large expansion of the public sector and the welfare state is a more recent development after the Second World War.
The Municipal Apportionment Act of 1919 governs the procedure when municipal boundaries are changed. Relevant for us is the Universal Succession law in Paragraph 4, which states that a newly amalgamated municipality inherits the old municipalities' assets and debts. Altogether this means that a municipality can be considered as an economically independent unit with the capacity and possibility to run an economic policy of its own and that a forthcoming amalgamation area is a common pool area.
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
We use panel data for the period 1946−1951 for all rural municipalities. During this period, there are only a few minor changes in borders. The largely unaffected boroughs and cities are excluded to improve the control group's characteristics. We obtain data from statistical yearbooks published by Statistics Sweden (SCB). 8 We have data for all rural municipalities during this period. Five of them contain missing values in some variables, and are left out.
Since we need some first differenced variables we lose one year and are left with five years.
The variables we construct and use are presented in Table 1 which describes and shows the means of the untreated control group and the treated (merged in 1952). The sample means are close to the means for the treated since these constitute 86.7 percent of the sample. For more descriptive statistics, see Table A1 in Appendix 1. The first group is our main variables of interest. Treat is the treatment dummy which takes the value zero for the untreated and one if a unit is merged in the beginning of 1952. It is a common pool dummy. Ratio is the ratio between the amalgam's and the old unit's population minus one, which is the proportional increase in population that, due to the amalgamation, has to share the old unit's debt. It measures the size of the common pool. Ratio is zero for the untreated and positive for the treated. On average, a treated unit is merged with 6.6 times its own population. NewPop is the amalgam's population minus the old unit's population, which is the increase in population due to the amalgamation. NewPop equals Ratio*Pop 51 and is thus the interaction term between Ratio and Pop.
We use the second group of variables in the cross section analysis for the whole period. The last group of variables is our instrumental variables. These are land area, Area, share of county's land area, AreaCoun, and district's population relative to own population minus 1, PopDist. The treated have on average higher values for all instruments. In the group analysis, we divide the sample into three roughly equal sized groups: A, B and C, with populations in the intervals 0-500, 501-1,000 and over 1,000 inhabitants. Table 2 shows the number of units in each group as well as the mean of Ratio and Debt i (for the whole period) for the untreated and the treated in each group. The mean of Ratio is much higher in units with lower population, since these are generally merged with more units which are populous relative to the own unit. We also see that the average increase in debt is higher for the treated in the two groups with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants (as expected from theory), but that the opposite is true for the group with more than 1,000 inhabitants. The result for the whole sample obtained earlier, and shown in Figures 2 and 3 , is therefore heavily influenced by the most populous units. 
EMPIRICAL STRATEGIES
To start with, the choice of change in per capita debt rather than expenditures as our dependent variable avoids some of the possible bias due to unobservables. Compared with studies of government size, factors such as economic growth, scale effects and monopoly rents are not expected to cause us any problems. Omitted variables may still concern us, since there may be selection to treatment (amalgamation) on unobservables, be it economic variables, voter preferences, or natural affinity with neighbor municipalities. We use fixed effects and instrumental variables to mitigate this problem.
Ordinary Least Squares
Here, we study the aggregate change during the whole period 1947−1951, with the almost complete cross-section of 2,280 municipalities. We assume throughout this paper that the treatment effects are the same for the treated and the untreated. When this is the case, the average treatment effect (ATE) coincides with the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT). To control for selection on observables, we use the control function approach, which is the usual OLS with control variables. To find ATE, we estimate:
where i indexes rural municipality units. Debt i is the dependent variable, Treat i is the treatment variable,
' is a vector of control variables and D i is a vector of district dummies, dropping one district to avoid multicollinearity. i is the unit specific error term. From common pool theory, we expect ATE = Treat to be positive.
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We use the between unit variation to identify ATE here. The controls correct for observed differences between units and the district dummies correct for some of the possible selection on unobservables.
We are also interested in the variation of the common pool effect to test the finer details of the law of 1/n. To analyze this, we estimate the following for the treated:
where Ratio i is the size of the common pool. We call the variation of the treatment effect among the treated the " ratio effect" . The law of 1/n predicts the ratio effect ( Ratio ) to be positive. We confine ourselves to the treated, since there might be other differences between the treated and the untreated interacting with the ratio effect. However, the results turn out to be independent of this restriction.
We also estimate the following for the whole sample:
Here, Treat and Ratio are the constant treatment and ratio effects, net the interaction between them. We thus allow an intercept and a linear treatment effect. In this setting Treat is no longer ATE, which has to be recovered by adding Treat to the product of Ratio and the mean of Ratio.
Fixed Effects
The cross section strategy do not allow us to examine the dynamics, control for time effects or use within-variation. To mitigate this problem, we exploit the panel dimension in our data, which allows us to include year specific treatment effects and year dummies. enough. We use an IV strategy to address this issue. IV also corrects for possible simultaneity and measurement errors. Further, IV can be applied on the cross section of municipalities to provide level estimates, and at the same time correct for more endogeneity than FE doesgiven that the instruments can be trusted.
We apply IV on both the cross section OLS and the panel FE set-ups. In the OLS set-up, there are three sources of omitted variables -time effects, unit specific unobservables and idiosyncratic unobservables. IV corrects for all three sources of endogeneity, but in the FE set-up, we only have to deal with the last factor. We use an IV strategy for Treat i and Ratio i one at a time as well as on both at once.
We use land area, Area i , and share of land area in the county, AreaCoun i , as instruments for Treat i 11 and estimate the following first-stage equation in the OLS set-up: 
Since most mergers are between units in the same district, we have high positive correlation between Ratio i and PopDist i as seen in Table 1 . The estimates of (6) in column [6] in Table   A2 
Matching
In the regression approaches, we assume that the nature of the selection on observables is such that the observables affect the dependent variable linearly (in parameter), which might not be a good approximation. A strategy that does not rely on this functional form is matching. In matching we match treated and untreated units according to similarities in observed variables, and we do not have to specify how the variables affect the dependent variable. Thus, selection bias caused by misspecification can be avoided. The identification uses local differences between observations with similar characteristics with respect to observables. This strategy can only be used to evaluate the ATE (which equals the ATT when we assume the absence of group specific treatment effects) and not the ratio effect.
Exact matching is not possible since the variables can take a continuum of values. We use a matching strategy based on propensity scores, which is the estimated propensity for treatment. In the first stage, we estimate the propensity scores. In this we are interested in obtaining as good propensity scores as possible, not in getting the parameter estimates right.
We estimate the following Probit model for the cross section on the whole period 1947 1951:
where P(*) is the probability of treatment and (*) is the cumulative standard normal distribution.
We impose common support, which means that for all sets of regressors, there should be a positive probability of nonparticipation. This is to ensure that we have untreated matches for all treated observations. Roughly, the treated and the untreated should be comparable with respect to the observables. Most districts contain only untreated or treated units, and including district dummies in (7) leads to perfect prediction for most units. Perfectly predicted observations violate the common support assumption and cannot be used. Including district dummies would therefore lead to a massive loss of observations.
A basic matching assumption is that the sample is balanced, which means that the treated and the untreated units are similar with respect to each observable. We check that the means of each variable are the same for the two groups. This is seldom the case for the whole sample, since the treated differ from the untreated on average. But by dividing the sample into propensity score intervals, balancing can be achieved in each interval. If not we have to try another specification. Equation (7) is chosen such that the balancing property is satisfied.
The final matching estimation can be carried out with different algorithms. We use nearest neighbor, kernel, stratification and radius matching. In nearest neighbor matching, each treated is matched with its nearest untreated neighbor. In kernel matching, several neighbors are used with weights given according to a kernel function. In stratification matching, a treated unit is compared with the untreated units within an interval. We use propensity score intervals that fulfill the balancing property. In radius matching, each treated unit is compared with all untreated units with a propensity score in a predefined neighborhood of the treated unit.
RESULTS

Cross Section Results
The OLS results based on equations (1) - (3) The positive ATE supports a common pool effect, while the low and statistically insignificant ratio effect is unfavorable of the finer details of the law of 1/n which predicts a positive and sizeable ratio effect. The size of ATE is economically significant since the mean increase in debt for the treated during the period is only 27.7 SEK per capita which corresponds to 2.8 percent of the average income or 63 percent of the average increase in income. Thus, the whole increase can be attributed to the common pool effect.
We get positive estimates for all controls and very small differences between OLS and IV. Higher Inc i and Inc i plausibly makes the municipalities afford a higher increase in debt.
Higher Dens i and Pop i also increase Debt i , as do Pop i which is perhaps counterintuitive.
But once we recall that we base identification on the cross section variation here, this last fact might not be that surprising. Inc i and Inc i are always statistically significant at 1 percent, while Pop i and Pop i are mostly insignificant.
When employing matching, we first estimate the propensity score equation (7). The estimates as well as the percentage correctly predicted are reported in equation (A1) and Table A3 in Appendix 2. The distribution of propensity scores across 8 strata fitted from the estimates is in Table 5 . The common support condition leaves 2,268 usable observations out of 2,280 (12 untreated observations are dropped). The division of strata guarantees that the balancing property is fulfilled. Some strata contain a small number of treated or untreated which might reduce efficiency. Note: There are thus 45 treated with a propensity score in the interval 0.40-0.60.
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In Table 5 we present matching estimates based on the common support region outlined in Table 4 . In the stratification procedure, we use the division of strata according to Table 4 , which ensures balancing within each stratum. With the stratification, the kernel and the radius (r = 0.1) procedures, we use the full set of treated and controls. We also use the full set of treated in all except the radius (r = 0.01) procedure. The ATE estimates are between 13.3 and 35.6 SEK per capita and statistically significant at 10 percent when using kernel and stratification matching. Compared to OLS, the direction of adjustment is ambiguous while the standard errors increase. But the most important result is that ATE stays positive and sizeable. Notes: a Analytical standard errors. b Bootstrapped standard errors with 200 replications. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Panel Results
The FE and FE-IV panel results based on equation (4) When doing this we assume that there is no effect in 1947. We report the RE estimates 14 for 1947 as a justification for this assumption. The aggregate effect then becomes β . RE equivalents to Table 6 are in Table A4 in Appendix 3 and are qualitatively similar to the FE results.
14 The RE estimation includes year-specific effect for all years and replaces fixed effects with district dummies. 
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
We get the dynamic pattern of ATE from FE in column Table A4 in Appendix 3 resemble the FE estimates.
We get the dynamic pattern of the ratio effect from FE in column [2] . The effects are small and insignificant relative to 1947. The solid line in Figure 5 plots the development. The largest effect is -0.20 SEK per capita, one year before the reform. The RE estimate for 1947 is very close to zero, 0.021 SEK per capita. The aggregate ratio effect is -0.29 SEK per capita, which is larger in size than the OLS estimate, and gives -1.9 SEK per capita for the average unit. Thus, with the FE correction, we obtain a small unexpected negative ratio effect.
17
With IV-FE, the effects turn highly negative for all years with statistical significance in 1948. The dashed line in Figure 5 plots the dynamic pattern. The IV-RE estimate for 1947 is close to zero and the IV-FE estimate can be interpreted as levels. The aggregate ratio effect is -1.5 SEK per capita and much larger than the unexpected negative ratio effect found using FE. The co-estimated intercept and ratio effects from FE in column [3] in Table 6 are close to the separately estimated effects in both size and pattern. Aggregate ATE can be recovered as give a similar pattern and the same size on the aggregate ratio effect as the separately estimated effects, but an aggregate ATE of 23.9 SEK per capita, which is much higher than the separately estimated effect, but close to the FE result. 17 The RE estimates in column [2] in Table A4 in Appendix 3 also resemble the FE estimates. 18 The RE estimates in column [4] in Table A4 in Appendix 3 resemble the FE estimates as well.
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The aggregate co-estimated intercept and ratio effects are plotted in Figure 6 , where we show the effects when varying Ratio. The fat solid line shows the FE result and the fat dashed line the IV-FE result. The co-estimated OLS and IV results are also shown, the former in the thin solid line and the latter in the thin dashed line. While the common pool effect is constant in the cross section analysis, it decreases with the common pool area in the panel analysis.
For units with very large common pools the panel result even suggest a negative treatment effect, since the negative ratio effect becomes larger than the positive intercept effect. While the mean Ratio for the treated is 6.6, the largest Ratio is 218.3, and the panel result certainly predicts an unexpected negative treatment effect for some units (9 units with the FEestimates). 
Ratio Results by Population Groups
To analyze the unexpected ratio effect for the treated, we divide the sample into 3 groups, A, B and C with 0 500, 501 1,000 and >1,000 inhabitants, and estimate the ratio effects with all previous set-ups but allowing for group specific effects. The results are presented in Table   7 . In the panel set-ups, we report the usual aggregate effect assuming no effect in 1947.
Alternative results, estimating the groups separately, or including an interaction term between Ratio and Pop (in 1951), NewPop, that restricts the ratio effect to depend linearly on population, are in Table A5 and A6 and equations (A2) and (A3) Figure 5 . The aggregate effect is negative for FE and highly negative for FE-IV. The other groups' ratio effects differ very much from the ratio effect for the whole sample which suggests that the ratio effect is different across groups.
19 Thus, the size of the ratio effect for the whole sample is highly influenced by and only representative for the small units. The standard errors are high and none of the group-specific effects are statistically significant.
The ratio effect appears to increase with population as the group-specific estimates are mostly lowest for group A and highest for group C. On the other hand, the FE-IV estimates show a reverse trend. The results also suggest that there is a negative ratio effect for group A, no effect for group B and a positive effect for group C. But the IV estimate in column [2] hints at the absence of a ratio effect for small units rather than a negative effect. In sum, there is no robust evidence for the presence of a ratio effect, neither a clear pattern of how such an effect varies with population.
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19 A similar analysis for ATE, either with Treat i estimated alone or co-estimated with Ratio i , reveals only small and non-systematic group specific effects, and does not change the overall qualitative pattern obtained without group specific effects. 20 The group by group estimation results in Table A5 and A6 as well as the interaction term specification results in Appendix 4 give some further support that the ratio effect increases with population with a negative effect for less populous units but a positive effect for more populous ones, and some estimates are sizeable and statistically significant. When evaluating the size of the ratio effect, we need to have the mean Ratio for each group in mind, which is 14.8 for group A, 5.3 for group B and 1.8 for group C as shown in The ratio effect appears to be of relatively low importance.
To speculate, a negative ratio effect for small units could be due to reduced activity when small units will be merged with populous units, since the chance of remaining in office is reduced with the size of the amalgam. A positive ratio effect for large units could possibly be explained by organizational differences which influence the ability to exploit the common pool. Although speculation about such finer details can be exciting, our results mostly indicate that the ratio effect is either small or absent. The exploitation of the common pool is largely non-systematic with respect to common pool size. The treated units increase their debt in face of amalgamation, but without much consideration of how large the optimal increase is. It might be that the municipalities simply spend extra resources on available projects as much as they could when facing an amalgamation and finance this by taking loans.
CONCLUSIONS
We argue that the Swedish amalgamation reform of 1952 is ideally suited for studying the common pool model of political decision making. We find that the treated (i.e. later amalgamated) municipalities increase their debt considerably more than the untreated municipalities before amalgamation. For the treated units, the common pool effect is of the same size as the increase in debt during the years before the reform, which is a sizeable share of total income (2.8 percent). However, we find no support for the common pool model as it is formulated by Weingast et al. (1981) , which predicts the effect to increase with common pool size. Our results show that the common pool size has a small and mostly statistically insignificant effect on the change in debt (in contrast to Tyrefors, 2006) . Possibly, this could be caused by limited opportunities for exploiting the common pool, resulting in less than optimal exploitation from each unit' s opportunistic perspective.
The reform of 1952 gives rise to a situation very much like the basic common pool model. Failing to find any treatment effect in such an ideal case would have provided rather strong evidence against the common pool model. Interestingly, we do not find complete support for the model even in this clear case. Caution is therefore called for when applying the common pool model to other less typical political situations. However, we do find evidence of free-riding when a common pool is present. The power to tax was used to shift 28 the burden of taxation to people in other political units, and our results indicate that such exploitation can be quite sizeable.
As argued by Weingast et al. (1981) the common pool problem is likely to permeate extensive parts of political decision making. Our results underscore such concerns even though fiscal exploitation before the Swedish amalgamation reform of 1952 appears to have been rather crude and unsophisticated when compared with their theory. Further empirical studies should therefore allow for a very imprecise reflection of the law of 1/n in political outcomes. In any respect, it ought to be an issue of constitutional importance to neutralize incentives for fiscal exploitation. 
APPENDICES Appendix 1. Additional Descriptive Statistics
